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Abstract 
 
This research will try to examine the strategy of FIDESZ government, the current government of 
Hungary, in acquiring political legitimacy. The thesis found that political legitimacy of Hungary 
has a pattern of relation between the regime and historical memory; this relation can be seen 
since the end of communist regime in 1989, which has been centred at the representations of 
historical memory to the public by political actors. The representations have become a tool for 
political actors to make them legitimate and gain popularity among the public. Thus, this paper 
will elaborate the political legitimacy of Hungary by focusing on the use of historical memory of 
the present government. In order to do so, it will analyse the text within the new constitution of 
2011 and the speeches of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán as he is the major political actor of the 
current government and, as the premier, he has opportunities to communicate with Hungarians 
very often. Thus, he has more opportunities to control political discourses for his and his party’s 
interest. 
 
Chapter 1: Hungary under an ill-liberal democratic practice  
 
After four decades of state socialist rule, Hungary adopted a liberal democratic system of 
governance following the collapse of Soviet hegemony over East-Central Europe in the late 
1980s.  Despite the institutional transition from the state socialist system to a liberal democratic 
polity, concerns have been expressed over what commentators have often identified as 
authoritarian elements in contemporary Hungarian politics. Hungarian politics seems to be 
marked by an ill-democratic development due to many reasons; the major condition of this 
concern is the adoption of the new constitution, “the Fundamental Law,” in 2011 and came into 
force in 2012 with an additional modification in 2013. It has been questioned over the violation 
of check and balance system, especially the limitation of power and independence of the 
Constitutional Court, and Human Rights’ principles. Hungary has been and is still being 
governed by the government of the Federation of Young Democrat-Hungarian Civic Alliance 
Party or FIDESZ1 led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán since 2010. With the majority in the 
House of Representatives after the election in 2010 and again in 2014, the FIDESZ government 
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has been able to implement and amend crucial laws. Not only EU bodies like the Venice 
Commission, scholars within the country also pledged their concerns over the government due to 
the new constitution and its policies (Dalos, 2012; Halmai, 2012). 
 An assessment of the democratic performance of the country in 2013 indicated that 
Hungarian democratic institutions have been  weakened since EU accession in 2004, more than 
any other member state according to the Freedom House Report, Nations in Transit 2013 (Ágh, 
2013; FH, 2013). Yet, the government of Prime Minister Orbán has been able to maintain 
popularity among Hungarian people. This is proved by the election of April 2014, where 
FIDESZ Party had again gained parliamentary majority, resulting to a third term for Orbán as 
premier2. If the concerns from the EU and Hungarian scholars are true, the major question here is 
why Hungarian voters have been confident in the ability of  FIDESZ and Viktor Orbán to 
administer for the second consecutive term (Ágh, Ibid).  
 There are currently various researches and academic articles trying to explain the 
situation in recent Hungary (Ágh, 2013; Bozóki, 2011; Dalos, 2012; Halmai, 2012; Széky, 2014; 
Tartakoff, 2012). They aim the study at government’s policies and the new constitution. For 
example, Bozóki (2011) observed the Orbán government through its national policies; he 
explains that the government by the Prime Minister declared the national cooperation in order to 
unite the whole country; but to achieve this declaration, the government adopted the new 
constitution which allows the parliament to appoint major officers in independent institutions, 
such as the Constitutional Court. With the majority in the parliament, FIDESZ is able to change 
any officer it wants. This also includes the President of Hungary. Meanwhile, other controversial 
laws are implemented, such as the media law of 2010, which sets up the media supervisory 
board, in which the government appointed anyone who is close to them. Meanwhile, with the 
power from the constitution, the FIDESZ government filled the National Electoral Commission, 
the body which is responsible for conducting clean and smooth elections, with its own people, 
and implemented new election law to limit the chance for minor parties to gain seats in the 
parliament. As a result, the new constitution has been criticised as the source of absolute power 
of the government and Prime Minister Orbán; György Dalos with other Hungarian intellectuals 
(2012) and Gábor Halmai (2012) also wrote articles published in eurozine.com, stating that the 
current constitution of Hungary is controversial and that the country is going under 
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authoritarianism and ill-liberal democratic practice. They said that the new constitution makes 
changes in three branches of the state, and that the media law and electoral law help FIDESZ 
strengthen its power in the country. It is obvious that to unite the country, FIDESZ government 
has expelled anyone who opposed them out of important positions and limited the voice of the 
oppositions.  
According to Bozóki (Ibid), the concept of “national unification” thus seems to be the 
core issue the Prime Minister had emphasised. There is a manifestation here: National unification 
refers to both symbolic and literal importance, in which the major events of the past, whether the 
Revolution of 1848 against the Habsburg rule, the Treaty of Trianon, the 1956 Revolution 
against the communist ruler, communism’s legacy and the force of globalisation, especially the 
integration with the EU, have been often mentioned  by the Prime Minister.  
 In other words, it seems history is crucial for Orbán in making messages to Hungarian 
public. According to its history, from the struggle in 1848 to democratic transition in 1989, 
Hungarians had experienced a multiple of emotions, whether good or bad. These memories are 
still mentioned by the state through at least the national holidays of March 15 for the 
commemoration of 1848 and October 23 for 1956.  
This research argues that historical reference might be a political tool for Hungarian 
politicians and governments in gaining political power, but the power can’t derive without the 
approval of Hungarians. Therefore, the communication from the government to Hungarians is 
the key to gain popular support. With political support, a government is legitimate to exercise the 
power through general elections, and it is certain that the government of FIDESZ party is 
legitimate due to democratic elections in 2010 and 2014. The main interest of this thesis 
therefore is to understand how the regime of FIDESZ party and Prime Minister Orbán are trusted 
by Hungarians to administer their country. The research believes that historical memories are 
crucial to Hungarian politics and the application of those memories as a political tool will help 
political actors gaining political power. Thus, the argument of this thesis is historical memory 
can help Hungarian regime to be legitimate, and it is necessary for political actors to make 
reference to the past memories in order to gain support or maintain the legitimacy.  
In this first chapter, the thesis will discuss and unpack the aims and the main research 
question of this study as well as attempt to sketch of the outline of this thesis. The second chapter 
will discuss the methodologies, the selection of the source for analysis, and will take a closer 
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look at the theory that underlies the work presented in the dissertation, whereas the third chapter 
will examine Hungary’s history over the last century, from the traumatic breakup of the Austro-
Hungarian empire and the establishment of modern Hungary to the imposition of Soviet rule 
after the second World War, the collapse of communism, Hungary’s transition to a liberal 
democratic polity, and after EU-membership to  contemporary political developments. This 
chapter aim to understand the major events and get a better sense of the historical background of 
the hold of contemporary ideologies of nationalism in Hungary.  
The fourth chapter will be literature review which aims to demonstrate the politics of 
legitimacy of Hungary before and after the FIDESZ government by looking at researches 
relevant to historical memories and political legitimacy in Hungary as a significant political 
factor in contemporary Hungary with an argument of the reason why it is crucial through a 
literature review of relevant academic researches. The fifth chapter will take a closer look into 
the application of historical memory and reference to it via the constitution and political 
addresses of the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán; it will be divided into two parts with the first 
section will take a close look at the statements within the constitution relevant to historical 
events, where the second section will analysis political speeches of the Prime Minister in order to 
see any reference to history and the conformity between his speeches, his government’s policies, 
and the constitution. The sixth chapter will attempt to bring together the various strands of the 
earlier discussion and summarize the findings of this project. 
  
Aim and Research Questions  
 
Széky (2014) wrote in his article “the Tradition of Nationalism”:  
 
“It is quite difficult to understand present-day Hungarian public affairs without being 
familiar with the particular nature of Hungarian nationalism, while it is impossible to 
understand its nature without knowing its centuries-old historical roots.”  
 
The nature he is referring to is what the thesis will try to investigate and analyse with the aim to 
understand the current politics of this country. The focus of this study will try to investigate the 
development of Hungarian politics from a historical perspective with an assumption that 
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historical memories constitute a very significant political resource in Hungarian politics, whether 
pertaining to the communist or post-communist democratic political life. The case studies of the 
utilisation of historical memories in Hungarian politics will be discussed in the literature review.  
 After investigating the relation between legitimacy and historical memory in Hungarian 
politics, the thesis will look more closely on the use of historical memories by the FIDESZ 
government and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in their communication with the Hungarian 
people. The thesis will focus on the constitution and Prime Minister’s speeches to examine that 
how the government and the premier utilises the memories to make him and his government 
legitimate in ruling the country and implementing laws and policies. A relevant and appropriate 
tool in the discussion of these questions and in addressing the hypothesis underlying this thesis 
can be located in the concept of political legitimacy, the theory of cultural trauma, and critical 
discourse analysis as the approach method to analyse the sources. Drawing upon the relevant 
literature (Alexander, Eyerman, Giesen, Smelser, & Sztompka, 2004; Ciobanu, 2010; Dienstag, 
1996; Dogan, 2009; Eyerman, 2001; Fossen, 2013; Pittaway, 2004; Sigwart, 2013; Sztompka, 
2000; Tota, 2006; Yankova, 2008), my assumption here is that historical memories became a 
massive factor of political legitimacy because they have been used to nurture, cultivate and 
propagate a sense of national trauma. Thus, the major hypothesis is: “the FIDESZ party obtains 
political legitimacy by using historical memory as the core concept of uniting Hungarian 
society” and “the historical memory strategy is capable of arousing national memory through a 
sense of national trauma it conveys”. To prove the hypothesis, I will endeavour to answer the 
following questions: 
 
1. What are the memories the government have drawing upon in order to gain political 
legitimacy? 
2. Why are these memories chosen as part of the political strategy of the government? 
3. How does the government use those memories for political legitimacy? 
 
To answer the first question, the thesis will discuss the previous researches in literature review in 
order to manifest the pattern of political strategies used by prior regimes to gain political interest 
and political legitimacy. In order to answer the second question, it is necessary to make a ground 
of historical development of Hungary; the thesis will describe a brief history of Hungary and 
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sketch the construction of national identity and current politics of Hungary. The third question 
will be discussed to seek the answer via the analysis of the sources the thesis will acquire. The 
sources for analysis will be explained in the methodology chapter.  
 
Chapter 2: Methodologies and theories  
 
This chapter will describe the methodologies in making this research and theories for analysing 
the sources it will examine. The type of research is qualitative as it will not analyse the data in 
terms of number or quantity, but texts and the conclusions of relevant literature as it aims to 
examine the utilisation of historical memories through political messages by FIDESZ 
Government and Prime Minister Orbán; it will study the constitution with a consultation with 
researches on the new constitution of Hungary, including the criticism (Dalos, 2012; Halmai, 
2012; Pogány, 2013; Tartakoff, 2012), because this Fundamental Law was drafted and adopted 
by FIDESZ party and it is accused of power abuse by the party as the ruling government party at 
present, whereas the analysis of the Prime Minister’s speeches will requires critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) as the main approach for the analysis. The thesis will limit its examination on the 
speeches of the premier to be between 2010 and 2014 prior the election of 2014. CDA will be 
discussed in this chapter to present its concept and the relevant issue to this thesis. The main 
theory for analysis will be “cultural trauma” and political legitimacy will be the main idea of the 
thesis argument which will be conceptualised; both will be discussed in the literature review. To 
begin with, the thesis will try to lay out a background of history of Hungary in order to illustrate 
the development of Hungarian nation, especially from the nineteenth century. Review of 
literature is the major foundation for the concept of the relation between political legitimacy and 
historical memory in Hungarian politics, whereas the notion of cultural trauma will be resorted to 
in order to analyse the text in the fifth chapter to demonstrate what the current government has 
created to gain their popularity.  
 
History and the Nation 
 
As this research will try to examine Hungarian politics from a historical perspective of its 
development and the significance of history to the politics, it is necessary to observe the 
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development of Hungarian history in order to visualise the image of Hungarian nation, identity, 
and politics. The main sources of historical reference here are “A Concise History of Hungary” 
by Miklós Molnár (2001) and “State of the Art and Historical Report” by Hunyady and Kiss 
(2003) with additional sources, such as academic journals, for more recent situations in Hungary 
prior to the 2010 election. This chapter will present the experiences Hungarians had encountered, 
which eventually created common identity, memories and nationalism which will be useful for 
later analysis in this paper.  
 The chapter will roughly begin by briefly mentioning the history of Hungary prior the 
nineteenth century and will emphasise the story from the Habsburg rule in the nineteenth 
century, where the Revolution for Independence of 1848 occurred. It will cover all the major 
events and incidents of the twentieth century from the separation from Austria, the Trianon 
Hungary, the communist rule, the 1956 Revolution, the transition to democracy, and democratic 
Hungary prior to 2010. 
 
Reviewing the literature 
 
Reviewing the literature will be divided into two sections: one will discuss political legitimacy 
and historical memories in Hungarian politics, and the other cultural trauma. The first section 
will try to conceptualise political legitimacy, and discuss relevant theories and historical 
memories as political legitimacy in Hungary. The thesis will discuss the use of historical 
memories in Hungarian politics from the transition to democracy between 1989 and 1990 to the 
recent politics before 2010. In order to prove the argument on historical memories and 
legitimacy in Hungarian politics, the thesis will examine the major events like “the Pozsgay 
affair” and the 2006 demonstration, which links to the 1956 Revolution. Also, the thesis will 
discuss the concept democratic legitimacy and the theory of legitimacy by Max Weber to make a 
clear understanding in the conception of legitimacy (Bartel, 1989; Buck, 2012; Ciobanu, 2010; 
Dienstag, 1996; Dogan, 2009; Fossen, 2013; Gaus, 2011; Pittaway, 2004; Pribersky, 2008; 
Sigwart, 2013). 
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Cultural Trauma  
 
This section of the literature review will try to demonstrate why historical memories have been 
pivotal to Hungarian politics by discussing the theory and concepts of cultural trauma in order to 
answer the second question of this thesis: why historical memories have been chosen to represent 
in politics of Hungary? It will try to elaborate the concept of cultural trauma in terms of national 
trauma because the thesis believe there is an association between national trauma and political 
discourse used by Hungarian government which have been referred to within the constitution and 
the Hungarian Prime Minister’s speeches; the sources for analysis seem to be political, but the 
messages within them are historical. It is necessary to point out the purpose of historical 
references in the texts, and to do so this thesis believes the theory of cultural trauma will be 
useful for the understanding of the application of historical memories within the texts. 
 The theory of cultural trauma will be discussed from relevant researches with the concept 
of collective memory and collective identity (Alexander et al., 2004; Eyerman, 2001; Sztompka, 
2000; Tota, 2006). The theory will be discussed mainly in the fourth chapter of literature review 
with the aim to link the analysis part in the fifth chapter.  
 
Critical Discourse Analysis and sources for analysis  
 
Apart from the analysis on historical reference in the constitution, the research will try to analyse 
the speeches of Prime Minister Orbán because he is the major political figure of the government 
who made several speeches to Hungarians, private sectors and international community. 
However, in order to study the effect of historical memories to political legitimacy, which can be 
approved by popular support, the research will focus on his addresses to general public; 
therefore, it will analyse national addresses of each year, especially on the two major public 
holidays of March 15 and October 23. It will also try to study his speeches in other events like 
the commemoration to the victims of communism, during his election campaign prior to the 
2014 election, for example. The major problem of this analysis is language barrier due to the 
inability in Hungarian language of the author’s thesis. Fortunately, the official website of the 
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Hungarian government3 is providing the premier’s speeches in English language. It is crucial for 
the Prime Minister to communicate with his supporters directly in order to gain popularity, 
which resulted to his victory in the latest election of 2014.  
In order to analysis the Prime Minister’s speech, discourse analysis is suitable for 
analysis as discourse means anything from a historical monument, a lieu de mémoire, a policy, a 
political strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the term, text, talk, a speech, topic-
related conversations, to language per se. Thus, discourse analysis is a study on the messages or 
purposes embedded in texts, documents, conversation, or concrete things like monuments or 
statue (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). However, this thesis will not study the speeches of the 
Hungarian premier in terms of linguistic study, but social and political context. Thus, critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) is the best approach from discourse analysis study because CDA is not 
interested in investigating a linguistic unit but in studying social phenomena which are 
necessarily complex and thus require a multidisciplinary and multi-methodical approach (Wodak 
& Meyer, Ibid). 
According to Teun A. Van Dijk (1993), CDA is a study on social power abuse, 
dominance, and social inequality under a social and political context. It is an approach to study 
and analyse the relation between society and dominated group of a society, which refers to the 
elites or institutions of such society. In other word, it is the study of how elites or institution 
control or use their power within the society with discourses. There are two levels of CDA: 
macro and micro levels. Language use, discourse, verbal interaction, and communication belong 
to the micro level of the social order. Power, dominance, and inequality between social groups 
are typically terms that belong to a macro level of analysis (Van Dijk, 2001). In the context of 
macro level of CDA, social power of an institution or a group will control social discourse 
through laws, rules, norms or habits, for example. Thus, those who control most influential 
discourse have more chances to control minds, actions and power of the society. Regarding this, 
anybody who makes speeches, texts, or communications to the society mostly will be able to 
control the discourse of the society, and, possibly, control the society. 
 Thus, politicians in today politics are able to control the discourses in their society 
because they have to usually speak to the public or implement policies in order to gain support. 
Their purposes of communication, according to CDA concept, are under discursive study, which 
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aims at purpose study of messages. Also, CDA will try to study how messages will affect to the 
society under the “preferred” context (Van Dijk, 1993, 2001); that is the recipients of each 
message will interpret the message in their own interpretation. Thus, in order to control the 
society, discourse speakers must think of the message the majority of the society will respond 
into the same way, and that requires a proper message in a proper context, which the majority of 
the society understand in the same direction. As the thesis focus on the application of historical 
memory for political interest and will look at historical reference in the speeches of Prime 
Minister Orbán, historical event he will refer or mention to must be public memory or major 
events of the past which the whole society knows or remembers.  
 
Chapter 3: A historical background  
 
In order to understand Hungary nowadays it requires more understanding in the concept of 
nationalism, national ideology and identity, which exist behind each major event. Modern history 
of Hungary is inundated with the emotion of freedom spirit, which had been aroused by 
revolutions for independence and the failures of revolutionaries. Due to the country’s location in 
between Western and Eastern Europe, the lives of Magyars had been shaped, controlled, and 
managed by superpower from both sides, from the Habsburg to the Tsar, from the Allied power 
to the Allies and Nazi Germany before the domination of Soviet Union. Currently, the European 
Union is the latest international actor coming to shape the future of this country. As a result of 
history, nationalism is still the core of the nation, which can be proved by the movement of 
extreme right group like JOBBIK and its connection with centre-right party like FIDESZ.  
 
Pre-1848: the formation of nationalism 
 
In the sixteenth century onward, central Hungarian state was occupied by Ottoman Turks, 
dividing the country into two parts: one belonged to the Habsburg in the West and the eastern 
parts in Transylvania. There were also buffer states between the two camps, where majority of 
the population was Magyars. This separation had developed nationalist ideas into two concepts 
as well: The west would assimilate itself with the Habsburg rule and became a type of 
conservatism which aimed to maintain the relation with the Habsburg, whereas in the east the 
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ideology of patriotism played a crucial role for nationalism to set Hungarians free from the Turks 
(Széky, 2014). When the Turks were forced out of the area, Hungarians were united with 
Austria. It was followed by Hungarian movement for independence soon. The first Hungarian 
nationalism under the Habsburg was noticeable in the struggle of Imre Thököly, leader of anti-
Habsburg uprising, and Prince Rákóczi of Transylvania, in the seventeenth century, plus the 
Protestant spiritual movement which bore the first literary fruits of the Magyar language 
(Vambery, 1944). 
   
1848 Revolution and its aftermath  
 
The French revolution of 1789 and 1848 boosted Magyar nationalism as well as the reform of the 
Hungarian language in the beginning of the nineteenth century. The trend of revolution in 1848 
was the most crucial for Hungarian movement in this century; as revolutions was waving across 
Europe, from Paris to Vienna, and from there to Budapest, the ideology of liberalism shaped the 
ideas of nationalists and revolutionaries (Molnár, 2001: 183; Vambery, Ibid). Hungarian scholars 
and politicians began the revolution in order to establish independent Hungary. This time it was 
led by Lajos Kossuth, the leader of the revolution with a slogan “the fatherland is in danger”, 
which ignited the fire of patriotism among Hungarians. At first, it was a peaceful revolution with 
the establishment of autonomy within Hungarian territories; the revolutionaries had tried to 
legitimate their plan. However, in November of the same year the war between Hungary and 
Austria was broke out. 
 In the beginning of the war campaign, it seemed that Hungarian army was able to handle 
the situation, but the cause of war was changed by the Russian Empire. Russian army invaded 
the east of Hungary, resulting to the caught between Habsburg and Russian troops. Hungarian 
diplomats failed to persuade international supports from the Western powers like the United 
Kingdom, France, or the United States. As a result, Hungarian army was defeated by the 
Russians and the revolution was failed. It would not be the last time the struggle for sovereignty 
of Hungary was shattered by the Russians and ignored by the West (Molnár, Ibid: 197 - 199). 
The Russians would return again in the twentieth century, depriving the sovereignty of 
Hungarians for the second time. The other factor that led to the loss in this revolution was the 
distrust of revolution leaders in other national minorities, such as Slovenian or Czech and Croat 
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people, which resulted to the lack of supports and troops to fight against the combination 
between Austrian and Russian troops (Vambery, Ibid).  
 
1867 – 1914: The year of compromise and dualist system 
 
Despite the failure of revolution and the suffering loss in the war for independence, Hungarians 
were still able to maintain their status in the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a major national along 
with the Austrians. In order to ease the tension between the two, Hungarian thinkers and 
politicians paved the way for compromise with the Habsburg Empire. Both parties reached the 
agreement in 1867, which established the dualist system between the two countries in one 
empire: Both Austria and Hungary had their parliaments, which were able to manage domestic 
affairs, but for foreign, monetary and military affairs must be under the command of the 
Habsburg in Vienna. This period was called a peaceful time for both societies (Molnár, Ibid: 
208; Széky, 2014). Meanwhile, the compromise gave a new start for Hungarian nationalism. 
Francis Deák, who was the instrumental in this compromise, realised that Hungarian nationalism 
could not survive without granting autonomy to the minorities, which formed the majority of 
population in Austro-Hungarian Empire, because without nationalism of other minorities 
Hungarians could not stand against the Habsburg; the failure of 1848 Revolution was a result of 
the lack of support from other nationalities, and the sense of nationalism might be fade away if 
all nationalities allowed the Austrian ruler to control in terms of culture and legality. He thus 
tried to suggest cultural autonomy law to minorities, but was refused by public opinion of 
Hungarian community due to the idea of superiority above other minorities (Vambery, Ibid). 
Actually, during the dualist system Hungary became one half of a middle-ranking 
European power. The country also gained more territories; for example, Transylvania, where 
some Hungarians lived there. The economy got stronger, though the ruling system was 
undemocratic due to six-per cent right voters. It was not a surprise for the sense of superiority 
above other nationalities, except Austrian, within Hungarian community. The period also 
experienced the atmosphere of a liberal and capitalist success story as other minorities, especially 
Jewish people, were able to assimilate into the society. Unfortunately, the tension of Europe 
politics led to the broke of the First World War and Hungary had to join the campaign with 
Austria.  
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The First World War and Independence from Austria 
 
Hungary had to join the war campaign with Austria without a choice, but the result of the war 
opened the opportunity for Hungary to split from the Habsburg. By 1918, it was clear that the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire was losing the war. As a result, Charles the IV of Hungary (Charles I 
of Austria), whose reign came after the death of Francis Joseph in 1916, declared the 
transformation of Austria into a federation in order to save his reign and his country. This 
encouraged the Hungarian parliament to declare the separation from Austria. The independence 
from Austria by late 1918 came with emotional mixture between joyful and disappointment; for 
Eastern part of the country, where Calvinists were strong, Hungarian were celebrating the first 
independence in many hundred years. On the other hand, there were people who disappointed 
with the situation; they missed the “good old day” of Hungary under the Habsburg. An economic 
research found that the dualism during 1867 – 1918 was favourable to modernisation and growth 
of economy (Molnár, Ibid: 242 - 246). Unfortunately, it was inevitable for the country to avoid 
the consequence of the First World War as a part of originators of the campaign. 
 The separation of Austro-Hungarian Empire might be what Hungary was waiting for such 
a long time, but there was also a huge price to pay. The nationalism of Hungary and the 
Hungarian status could stand because of the pillar by the Habsburg. Without this pillar, 
Hungarian nation on its own could not face the Western power (Vambery, 1944). And by late 
1918 under the presidency of Mihaly Karolyi, the country gave way to the second Bolshevik 
dictatorship in the world, but even that could not survive the political and military pressure of the 
Entente. Besides, there was a small civil war in 1919 between communism and aristocrat with 
the intervention from the Romanian Army, who supported a former military leader Austro-
Hungarian Empire, Miklós Horthy. The victory of the Romanian troops opened the gate for 
Horthy to power in Hungary. He ruled the country as the Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary 
without king and his power was absolutism. The national system that emerged during his prime 
maintained the feudal symbols of the past, and large estates survived within the restricted borders 
of the country, but a multi-party parliament still operated (Hunyady & Kiss, 2003). 
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Hungary under the Trianon Treaty 
  
The separation from Austria left Hungary to counter its fate alone during the peace conference in 
1920, where Hungarian representatives failed to make any negotiation and were forced to accept 
the Peace Treaty of Trianon, which resulted as the loss of two-third of Hungarian territories  to 
successor states of former Austro-Hungarian Empire: Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia 
(Széky, 2014). The size of the country then was deteriorated to be roughly like the present 
Hungary. The loss of territories through the Trianon Treaty and millions of ethnic Hungarians 
laid the foundations for the anti-socialist and anti-liberal system consolidating its power in a 
kingdom without a king to follow a policy demanding the revision of the newly established 
national borders 
The loss of territories did not only affect the country, but also Hungarians who lived in 
those losing areas. They became minorities by a day. Today Hungarian minorities in Romania, 
Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Czech Republic are the children of those Hungarians. It was also 
the end of Historical Hungary with the loss of those territories and the end of the monarchical 
rule. This loss spurred another wave of nationalism. The elites of Hungarian society blamed 
liberal side and Jewish people as the principal of this national disaster, whereas the traditionalism 
of Hungarian society was raised as an uncontested value (Széky, 2014).  
From 1920 – 1944, under the Regent Miklós Horthy, former naval admiral of Austro-
Hungarian Empire, the concept of “Greater Hungary” was revived to arouse national feeling 
among Hungarians; the concept was changed from civic imagination into violence and raised the 
emotion of ethnocentrism among Hungarians and Hungarian authorities which later went against 
minorities in Hungary, including Jews (Segal, 2014), but it was the desire to recover territories 
lost under the Trianon Treaty, not anti-Semitism, that led him to side with Hitler and because his 
attempt to negotiate with Western powers, particularly Great Britain and France, to reclaim those 
lost territories was ignored (Tartakoff, 2012).  
Actually, the generation which lived through the Trianon Treaty could not cope with this 
destruction of their historical traditions; they yearned for the continuation of statehood and 
economic integration, and the irredentist demand for territorial revision enjoyed unanimous 
support. Later, the foreign policy of Horthy's regime drifted towards Italian and German fascism, 
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which was seen as the only hope of breaking the restrictions imposed by the Little Entente. 
(Vambery, Ibid).  
Therefore, the promise from Adolf Hitler, the leader of Nazi Germany, to Horthy that he 
would be able to tack back those territories to Hungary was the reason of Hungarian decision 
prior to the Second World War. The result of the war proved that Horthy’s decision to seek ally 
with Hitler was a huge mistake, but there was a real hope that this ally would bring back the 
historical Hungary; between 1938 and 1941, Hungary regained some lost territories back with 
the help of Nazi army. However, this resulted to the subordination to German foreign policy, 
which Hungarian troops joined the campaign of the war, including the invasion to Soviet 
territories (Jeszenszky, 2006). Then, when Soviet army turned the tide of the battle, the situation 
was changed. Horthy later was hesitate about extending the cooperation with Hitler and finally 
decided to withdraw the agreement between the two countries. This led to the German invasion 
in Hungary in 1944. The whole country was turned into battles between the German and Soviet 
armies. Budapest was ruined by bombardment. By late 1944, Soviet troops liberated the country, 
but Hungary since then could not be an independent state again for almost 50 years.  
 
After the Second World War 
 
The result of the Second World War had been terrible for Hungary than the First World War’s. 
The country this time did not lose further territories, but what it lost was higher: its sovereignty. 
Despite the first free election in 1945, the country was forcefully handed itself to communism. 
Stalin insisted on restoring the Trianon border, which meant Hungary again had to hand back 
those territories it received during the first stage of the war back (Széky, 2014).  Again, the 
country’s fate was decided by superpowers from both the East and the West. Kremlin had asked 
for its responsibility over Hungary and Eastern part of Europe, which the West granted. After the 
war, Hungary needed to rebuild the country from the ruin, but it was still able to hold an election 
and form a new government. Even with Soviet support, the Hungarian Communist Party was 
unable to win a swift electoral victory. A multi-party coalition government existed between 1945 
and 1948, but the communists took possession of the key positions within the government; 
Moscow sent in people who called Muscovites, or Hungarian communists who were trained or 
taught in Soviet Union, to play political roles in Hungary. , As a result, elected government of 
19 
 
Hungary was forced to hand the ruling power to the communist party of Hungary in 1948, and 
one-party dictatorship of the proletariat was eventually instituted in Hungary as in other 
countries (Hunyady & Kiss, 2003).  
Besides, Istvan Bibo in between 1945 and 1956 analysed historical developments in order 
to learn from a historic downfall. He blamed the social structure and the counter-selection of the 
elite, alienated and divided from the people. In searching for the causes of the revolution of 
1956, the official ideology blamed the previous nationalism, which was anti-German, for the 
uprising. Jeno Szucs pointed out that national character is not eternal, but is a consequence of a 
given historical development. It doesn't explain anything in a nation's history, but national 
character itself needs explanation (Hunyady & Kiss, Ibid).  
 
1956 Hungarian Uprising  
 
The first ten years under the dominance of Soviet Union ended with another tragedy, but very 
heroism. The death of Stalin in 1953 led to de-Stalinisation in Eastern Europe. In 1956, there was 
a large protest in Hungary due to anti-Stalinist group and the situation in Poland, where the 
Polish dissidents were forced to be members of the Polish Communist Party.  People in Budapest 
supported those dissidents by protesting the Soviet control on the streets of Budapest (Molnár, 
2001: 311). The protest developed into a genuine nationalist and anti-communist revolutionary 
events (Ciobanu, 2010); not only in Budapest, where people fought against Soviet troops, but 
also around the country saw the same thing. This became the headlines of media around the 
globe; they praised what Hungarians were doing. There was a belief that this revolution might 
accomplish and the country would become independent. Imre Nagy as the interim Prime 
Minister announced the neutrality of Hungary and the resignation from the Warsaw Pact of the 
communist side (Molnár, 2001). This made Kremlin made the reaction with the decision to 
invade Hungary (Dienstag, 1996).  
The dramatic events of 1956 were the outcome of several years of fermentation. They left 
two unforgettable memories with all those who lived them through and participated in them. The 
first was the feeling of unprecedented national unity on 23 October, when hundreds of thousands 
of people expressed their unanimous wish to break with Stalinism. The troubled and repeatedly 
reformed government of Imre Nagy followed events rather than directed them, and after initial 
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hesitation the government committed itself to political pluralism and national independence. 
With the Soviet military intervention, the second fundamental truth of 1956 emerged, one which 
was to become the determining political experience of a whole generation: the loneliness and 
defencelessness of a country, being entirely on its own, the knowledge that despite their 
reassurances, declarations of solidarity, and real humanitarian intentions, not one other country 
was prepared to help Hungary (Hunyady & Kiss, 2003).  
The invasion on November 4, 1956, gave an abrupt end to the national revolution; even 
though Hungarians succeeded in expelling the Soviet troops and the communist government 
during the first phase of the revolution, the full deployment of soldiers and tanks of Soviet Union 
trashed their hope of independence. They tried to fight back, but failed. It was not the first failure 
of Hungarians for independence, but this was very recent in its long history and pain from this 
memory still exists in present Hungary.  
 
After 1956 toward the democratic transition 
 
After the repression of the anti-communist revolution in 1956, the mechanism for legitimating 
the communist system adopted by Janos Kadar was to avoid a similar revolutionary explosion 
and ensure passive consent. Janos Kadar became the head of a new puppet government. In the 
name of the so called "two-front struggle", he prevented a second return of the Stalinist Rakosi 
from Soviet exile, but he also cooperated in the arrest, trail and execution of Imre Nagy. After 
1960s, nationalised heavy industry was preserved and expanded, but the rigidity of the centrally 
planned economy was relaxed, the independence of companies increased, and foreign trade 
relationships were opened up. Hungary became the most open country in the Soviet block to the 
international flow of information (Hunyady & Kiss, Ibid). Kadar was quick to transform his role 
from oppressor of the revolution into a reformer (Ciobanu, 2010). His famous 1961 declaration 
“Whoever is not against us is with us!” was an open invitation for reconciliation and 
compromise. He introduced a degree of cultural liberalism and opened the economy towards the 
West (Molnár, 2001: 330).  
During 1960s - 1970s, the Bolshevik totalitarianism was engaged with national traditions. 
Thus, nationalism itself appeared even before the democratic change in East Europe. Part of this 
nationalist turn was the revival of nineteenth century mythology, the upgrading of the importance 
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of independent statehood, the undervaluation of neighbouring nations and minorities, and the use 
of the totalitarian means to extinguish these minorities. By the time, Hungary on 15 March, the 
day for remembering the civic revolution of 1848, was not an officially recognised holiday. 
Discussing the problems of the Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries remained a 
taboo for decades. It was a form of resistance of the intellectuals to express solidarity toward 
these Hungarian minorities. In the 1980s the value of national independence and democracy were 
connected to each other (Hunyady & Kiss, Ibid).  
The Democratic movement returned to the country in by early 1980s, especially among 
scholars and writers. The country had gradually changed throughout 1980s; reformist factions 
finally defeated Kadar and the moderate Karoly Grosz succeeded to the leadership of the party in 
1988. In 1989, Imre Pozsgay interpreted the 1956 revolt as a popular uprising, which led to an 
extraordinary meeting in which members of Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) agreed 
to introduce a multi-party system (Dienstag, 1996). It is significant also that the final demise of 
the regime was deeply affected by the symbolism of the 1956 revolution. It was the 
commemoration of this event that attracted street demonstrations, protests from civil society 
groups and the refusal of hardliners to acknowledge its revolutionary importance that determined 
the Central Committee to take radical decisions in favour of reform at its meeting in February 
1989. Fortunately, the Soviet Union faced an economic crisis and the Soviet Empire was split 
gradually from 1989. As a result of the mass demonstrations commemorating the 1956 and 1848 
revolutions, the communist party decided to make actual concessions to the opposition at the 
roundtable (Yankova, 2008). Meanwhile, the parliament of Hungary and Hungarians repeated 
the act for independence by asking Soviet troops to withdraw from Hungarian territories and the 
parliament announced the first free election since 1945 and turned the country to the hand of 
democracy.  
Hungary was the first country in the region to start changing, but the significance of 
Hungary's pioneering role soon decreased. During the transition, the values of independence 
were stressed, and traditionally national values were revitalised in the reestablishment of national 
symbols. Regarding national days, the foundation of the Hungarian state and the revolutions of 
1948 and 1956 have become celebrated as a means of expressing historical continuity (Hunyady 
& Kiss, 2003). 
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Post-communist era 
 
In 1990, there was the first free election since 1945 and the first democratic government was 
elected. The communist party disappeared, but came under the new form as the Socialist Party 
(MSZP), whereas there were other parties coming for the election, whether FIDESZ or the 
Young Democrats, Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), and Christian Democrats. In the first 
election, MDF received the victory and formed the government with Christian Democrats and 
FIDESZ. József Antall became the first Prime Minister of the third republic of Hungary. In 
general, the development of democratic polity of Hungary was going well; liberal democracy 
was under progress characterized by a multiparty system, free elections, representational 
government, a strong opposition, and free media with credible institutions that protected the rule 
of law and independent courts. The politics has developed into two poles between the left of 
socialsit and liberal parties and the rigth of conservative and nationalist parties (Palonen, 2009). 
During the two decades after 1989, incumbent governments had lost every election (with the 
exception of 2006), the media criticized politicians heavily, democracy was consolidated; and in 
2004, Hungary joined the European Union. There was a conclusion that prior to 2010 Hungarian 
democracy is a successful story of democratic consolidation (Bozóki, 2011). The crisis of 
democratic era began in 2006 with the lying speech of Ferenc Gyurcsány, the Prime Minister 
from the Socialist Party, MSZP, who confessed that he lied about the country’s economic figure, 
leading to street protests and the movement of the centre-right and extreme right groups. Since 
then, the right groups have gained stronger support toward the victory in the 2010 election of 
FIDESZ party and the appearance of extreme right group like JOBBIK, which has brought 
concerns to the EU due to its extreme nationalist policies to protect the sovereignty of Hungary 
and protest against the European integration. Currently, the government of FIDESZ party and 
Prime Minister Orbán are taking charge of the country with the majority in the parliament. The 
adoption of new Fundamental Law in 2011 has given absolute power to the government and 
there are more concerns that Hungary might be a problem of anti-integration despite its full EU-
member status. The nationalist polices of the current government and the movement of extreme 
right groups will be the major focus of the country during these years and there is no sign that the 
opposition or other forces can make a change to the current situation, which leads to the propose 
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of EU intervention to its member state’s domestic affair. This is the story to be continued in the 
years to come.  
 
Chapter 4: Literature Review  
 
Concept of political legitimacy  
 
At first, the definition and concept of political legitimacy will be discussed to make it clear in the 
meaning and the usage of its concept for this research in the case of Hungary. There are several 
scholars discussing the political legitimacy; for example, Fabienne Peter (2014) states that 
political legitimacy is a virtue of political institution and of the decisions – about laws, policies, 
and candidates for political office – made within them, whereas Thomas Fossen (2013) refers to 
it as the right of political authority to rule over citizens and territory. Legitimacy can be related to 
morality as well according to Buckley who points out that legitimacy of a regime can be 
accepted by citizens based on the morality in a certain context of the society (Buckley, 2013). 
Jürgen Habermas states that legitimacy means a political order’s worthiness to be 
recognised, which need good arguments for a claim of political order to be recognised as right 
and just (in Gaus, 2011). According to Habermas, orders in this sense are from political regimes, 
and they must be recognised by citizens of a regime as “correct” orders, which, in other word, 
mean they must be acceptable. However, the acceptance of each society is different due to 
specific factors of each one, such as historical development, cultures, and geography; thus, the 
“virtue” of institutions and decisions of each political regime within a particular realm will be 
different: if members of a particular society accept a political order, the order, according to 
Peter’s definition, would be interpreted as the representation of ‘virtue’ by the political regime of 
such society by its members. The virtue, or the legitimacy in this sense, requires ‘reason’ or 
‘explanation’ members of a political order view it as acceptable, which Barker (In Gaus, ibid) 
states that political actors will make an explanation or a claim of legitimacy. Thus, political 
actors are central of the claim for political legitimacy.   
 A main question over political legitimacy is the measurement of legitimacy of a regime. 
Max Weber’s theory of legitimacy has been the standard to make the measurement; he classifies 
the source of legitimacy into three categories: the tradition of society, the charisma of leaders, 
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and the legality (In Couto, 2010). However, Mattei Dogan (2009) argues that the first two 
sources are scarcely applicable to the present global politics, which means Weber’s typology of 
legitimacy sources is anachronism. This is because the idea of Weber in traditional legitimacy is 
mainly based on monarchical rules, whereas leaders with charisma today are unclear due to the 
majority of democratic regimes in the world. Thus, the legality of the law is likely to be the only 
applicable proposal from Weber’s theory in today politics.   
Apart from the legality, Mark Pittaway (2004) and Morris (2008) argues that social 
norms can be the measurement of legitimacy; Pittaway refers to David Beethem that legitimate 
power can be discerned if the exercise of power conforms to rules that are established legally or 
socially, while Mark Philip argues that the concept of legitimacy intricately connected with the 
value in political domain of a society (In Sigwart, 2013). A government must act accordingly to 
the society’s demand or desire. Thus, people within the society will be a factor to legitimate 
status of a political regime. It is the relation between citizens and government, in which Danial 
Gaus (2011) argues that legitimacy refers to the beliefs of individuals in the rightness of political 
order. In a democratic system, this belief conforms to the election of a country. Buck (2012) 
argues that in democratic system citizens are the effective source of political authority to be 
legitimate as citizens elect the government according to the rule of law. However, it is not just an 
election for a democratic regime to be legitimate. The political performance of the regime is a 
factor to the loss or gain of legitimacy as well. 
In the case of Hungary, despite a low democratic performance measured by democratic 
watchdogs (Ágh, 2013; FH, 2013), the government of FIDESZ party is thus far successful in 
politics. It has recently gained the majority in the parliament from the 2014 election once again. 
The election is the legitimacy according to the democratic system because the people approve the 
right to rule the power of a regime. Thus, according to this measurement, the current government 
of Hungary is legitimate. The main question is how it is able to gain this legitimacy despite many 
accusations of ill-liberal democratic practice.  
 
Previous studies on political legitimacy of Hungary 
 
This research will focus on the impact of historical memories since 1989 or the transition from 
communism to democracy of Hungary. From reviewing the literature on political legitimacy in 
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Hungary related to historical memories, it appears that historical memories had been represented 
and interpreted by political actors with an intention to make changes in politics, whether political 
reform or political campaigns to criticise political opponents. The first case is the situation of 
1989; Joshua Dienstag (1996) examines the “Pozgay Affair” which is a clear example of the 
relation between political legitimacy and historical memory in Hungarian politics. In 1989, Imre 
Pozgay as the Minister of State of Hungary mentioned the 1956 event, where Hungarian people 
spurred an uprising against the communist regime and soviet troops with an aim to be 
independent from the Soviet Bloc. The event was officially called by the regime after 1956 as 
“counter-revolution”, but Pozgay called it as “popular uprising” which raised the question of the 
true meaning of the uprising. Dienstag states that the political legitimacy of the communist 
government of Hungary is to present itself as the true representative of Hungarians. If the 
communist government was behind the suppression of the 1956 uprising, which according to 
Pozgay was a popular or “people” uprising, then the communist regime is not the representative 
of Hungarians, but Soviet domination. The Pozgay Affair had threatened the legitimacy of the 
communist regime, which later led to a multi-party system, the first free election, and the end of 
communism in Hungary in 1990.  
Monica Ciobanu (2010) studied the communist regimes of Eastern Europe prior to the 
transition of 1989 that the communist regimes claimed their right to rule through a combination 
of traditional and rational-legal forms of institutional practice and normative. The discussion of 
the relationship between serious problems of legitimacy and the collapse of communism in 
Hungary was reformulated because the elites of Hungarian society had lost its confidence in the 
regime and decided to withdraw their support for it. During the transition, the communist 
political authorities in Eastern Europe failed in establishing rational-legal forms of legitimacy 
based on formal rational bureaucratic administration. They allowed an increase in popular 
dissatisfaction that had taken open forms of social protest, which came as the form of 1956 
commemoration. The de-legitimation of East European regimes was also affected by on-going 
criticism and subversive of dissident activities by segments of the intelligentsia. 
Gregana Yankova (2008) studied the impact of historical memory during the transition 
period from communism to democracy of Hungary and Soviet Union. She refers to the Pozgay 
affair as a new interpretation of the 1956 protests, which expressed the feeling and thought of 
Hungarians to the regime. Thus, the regime that forcefully crushed the uprising was therefore 
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illegitimate, which regarding the Pozgay affair led to the transition of the political system 
between 1989 and 1990. Moreover, she suggests that history is an instrument for political actors 
to make impacts on political atmosphere, and there are only political actors who are able to 
recollect historical memory according to actor-oriented theories in her research.   
In 2006, there were large protests against the socialist government in Hungary. Andreas 
Pribersky (2008) studied the protest and found that both the government and the main opposition 
party of Hungary had competed in interpreting and presenting national history in order to gain 
political legitimacy. The protests in the year were also related to the 1956 Revolution; they began 
on October 23, the same day the revolution began fifty years ago; it was not only to refer to the 
past, but also for delegitimising the current government as the opposition party had tried to link 
the socialist government with the communist regime of prior 1989. The key bridge between the 
1956 and 2006 protests was the outcry against lying as an instrument of acquiring and 
legitimising political power: the communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe have been 
seen as lying governments about the countries’ conditions and history. There were battles for 
memory-politics between the government and the opposition party; the 1956 Revolution was the 
core message of the protests in order to delegitimise the government as the heir of the communist 
regime, which was illegitimate for the suppression of the 1956 Uprising. Meanwhile, Ferenc 
Gyurcsány, the Prime Minister from MSZP government party, had tried to legitimise himself by 
referring his political heritage to be akin to Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister in 1956 and the 
representative of Hungarians during the Revolution.  
The common issue each study related together is the 1956 Revolution. The meaning of 
this event had made impacts to both the end of the communist regime between 1989 and 1990 
and the protest in 2006. The democratic transition was mainly driven by the commemoration of 
the event and the studies on this transition clear show the importance of historical memory and 
political legitimacy of Hungarian communist regime. As for the 2006 protests, the study of 
Pribersky presents a clear picture of the battle for political legitimacy through historical memory 
between the then socialist government and centre-right opposition party, which was led by 
FIDESZ Party, the current ruling party of the government.  
Udi Lebel study political movement in Israel by using historical memory for political 
purposes; he points out that national memory are not social institutions that formed 
spontaneously, democratically or pluralistically, but rational projects featuring power 
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relationships, shaped by actors promoting political interests through it and legitimising their 
preferential social status and political dominance. He also indicates that the application of the 
memory-screening strategies is needed to make the public memory and public historiography 
controllable resources and to exclude political rivals from the national pantheon. Also, it is 
necessary to supervise national historiography, including history textbooks and commemorative 
literature (Lebel, 2009). Besides, he refers to previous studies on public memory; for example, 
James Young (1993) who wrote that ‘Memory is not formed in a vacuum’, in the introduction to 
his book, “The Texture of Memory,” and that ‘the motives of memory are never pure’. It means 
that historical memory can be represented for a purpose, and if it is repeated by political actors, it 
is highly possible to be for political interest.  
Another recent obvious example of political movement related to historical memory in 
Hungary in the protests of 2006. According to the article by Pribersky (Ibid), he proposes that the 
movement of the demonstration in 2006 led by the opposition had been spurred by the 
remembrance of the 1956 Revolution; he mentions the term “memory politics” as an instrument 
of public mobilisation; for example, the radical right group during the protest in 2006 mentioned 
Hungarian history in terms of distortion, falsification, and misuse of it by the communist regime 
before 1989 and tried to link this regime to the 2006 socialist government. This is an attempt to 
raise social and political movement by memories of Hungarian society, which is a political tool 
for the opposition party and the radical right group to fight against the 2006 government. Anna 
Tota (2006) proposes that a public memory can add a specific focus on the relation with the 
public sphere, and the capacity of memory work to intervene and affect the public discourse of a 
nation. Thus, public memory is an instrument for political actors to make a change on public 
discourse which is able to make a political move within a society. This can work if the members 
such society have experienced the memory together or have been related to the memory. It leads 
to “collective memory”, which, according to Pribersky, fastens distinct political and social 
groups to the same history, historic places, and archives. Collective memory of the groups will 
eventually lead to common identities or collective identities of such society.  
According to Pavlaković (2013), the selection of particular dates and events which are 
commemorated, in other words, the construction of a national calendar provides significant 
insight into how a state seeks to define its past. He refers to the words by Serbian sociologist 
Todor Kuljic´, “the calendar is, therefore, a symbolic manifestation of invented history.” 
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Therefore, national holidays related to historical events are an elemental construction of a 
country’s memories, especially if they are anniversaries of major historical events. They can help 
the country form its identity through historical memories, and the study on public and national 
holidays can help scholars understand better about the country they are studying as well. 
The work of Khazanov and Payne (2008) might be a good summarisation about historical 
memory; they state that collective or historical memories are in fact constructions, very often 
fabrications, by elites, whether of states, political interests or the media. Not surprisingly, 
scholars will tend to dismiss them as, at best, myths. In addition, the legitimacy of the emerging 
democratic order becomes stronger if the new political elite have genuine democratic credentials 
at the highest level. Political regimes are created, supported and changed not by blind political 
forces but by human beings responsible for their actions and inactions. Also, the incidents of the 
twentieth century are not distant far enough for the atrocities, crimes, and repressions of this 
century to be forgotten or forgiven. And there is also a danger that this past may be revised and 
manipulated by partisan political forces.  
To conclude, regarding all relevant literature above, historical memory is a memory of a 
nation or a society which has been constructed and represented by influential factions of the 
country or the society with purpose. This purpose might be for nationalism or for political 
interest in a crucial moment like general election or political transition. The memory will be 
selected carefully and it must be an event which once caused or generated a massive impact to 
the whole society or nation. Thus, it seems historical memory mentioned in a particular moment 
will not coincidentally appear, and it is likely that this kind of memory can be often a political 
tool in the game of political power. In the next section, the paper will discuss how historical 
memory becomes a political tool for political actors in Hungary. 
  
Cultural Trauma  
 
A historical memory can be a collective or common memory of a society. In the case of 
Hungary, the 1956 Revolution is obviously a historical memory with an impact to politics. Not 
only the 1956, the revolution of 1848 has been also commemorated each year on March 15, 
whereas the events after the First World War, like the Trianon Treaty, and during the Second 
World War, like the deportation of Hungarian Jews, have been the issues to politics from time to 
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time. The recent historical events of Hungary were related to wars, revolutions, and the loss of 
territories. They were negative experiences of the country, but also have been repeated by 
political actors since 1989, especially during a political conflict. The negative feeling has been 
transformed into political movements which press the regime to make changes depending on the 
situation. In order to understand this process, the paper will adapt the theory of cultural trauma to 
explain the use of historical memory by political actors for political interest with an assumption 
that the public memory of Hungarian society is comprised of traumatically historical memories. 
With the memory of trauma in history, Hungarian political actors are able to repeat it again when 
they are in need of political interest. 
Alexander et al (InTota, Ibid) investigates the relation between memory, identity, and 
public discourse to find the formation of collective identities; their model explores the mark of 
permanent memories and identities of the collectivity of a society. It is assumable that a negative 
experience or controversial issue will mark itself inside the memory of a society as Alexander 
argues (Alexander et al, 2004: 1) that, “cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity 
feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group 
consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental 
and irrevocable ways.”  
As for the definition, trauma is a collective memory, a form of remembrance that grounds 
the identity-formation of a people. As cultural process, trauma is mediated through various forms 
of representation and linked to the reformation of collective identity and the reworking of 
collective memory. Cultural trauma refers to a dramatic loss of identity and meaning, a tear in 
the social fabric, affecting a group of people that has achieved some degree of cohesion. Its 
traumatic meaning must be established and accepted, process which requires time, as well as 
mediation and representation (Eyerman, 2001). Besides, trauma doesn’t naturally exist, but it is 
socially constructed (Tota, Ibid). 
According to social change theories, Piotr (Sztompka (2000)) explains the concept of 
trauma as an event with negative, dysfunctional, and adverse effects to the society, becoming a 
trauma of change which inflicts on the society. He refers to the trauma as an impact on the 
cultural tissue of a society, which makes changes within such society and appears as an aftermath 
of a negative event or incident. This trauma will become a cultural phenomenon, which is in 
need of an interpretation of the meaning that caused the trauma. Cultural trauma can be 
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preserved in collective memory of a society; it will gain salience when there is any conducive 
circumstance occurring, which can cause a movement among members of a society to 
commemorate it negatively or positively. There are many cases that can become a trauma for a 
society, such as wars, revolutions, genocide, assassination of political leaders, collapse of the 
market, etc.  
A trauma can become a cultural trauma through the trauma process, which is the process 
of representation of a horrendous event of a society; a carrier group of the negative memory will 
project the trauma claim to the public. A process must deal with the nature of the pain, the nature 
of the victim, the relation of the victim to the wider audience, and the attribution of 
responsibility. There are six arenas a trauma will be produced: religious, aesthetic, legal, 
scientific, mass media, and state bureaucracy. Through this process, the collective memories and 
the national identities will be affected (Tota, Ibid). And such collective memory will function to 
create social solidarity in the present because it is a recollection of a shared past, retained by 
members of a group that experienced the past event. Such event will be interpreted from the 
perspective of the group depending on its need and interest (Eyerman, Ibid). Thus, in terms of a 
political group, political interest will be the centre of interpretation of a past event. In the case of 
Hungary, the right-wing group of 2006 or the reformer of 1989 had interpreted the 1956 
Revolution and represented its new interpretation to the public with the objective of political 
interest for the group. Their strategy was viable because the event was a negative experience of 
being suppressed and suffered by a large group of Hungarian society, which has been passed on 
as a historical memory among Hungarians till the present. This memory is also a relation 
between the political power and the subjects which caused movements and changes in political 
regimes.  
In the case of Hungary, there are some researches discussing national trauma of the past. 
For example, Marta Erdos (2010) studies the legacy of state socialism in Hungary; one legacy is 
the memory of 1956 which she states in her article that the 1956 Revolution is a trauma which 
had been kept in silence after the year by the communist regime led by Janos Kadar. He needed 
to reformulate the society and prevent the uprising, so he produced a statement, “he who is not 
against us is with us” in order to compromise the atmosphere in the then Hungarian society after 
the uprising. According to her article, it is clear that the 1956 is a national trauma of Hungary, 
but during the communist regime it was necessary for the government to deflect the memory by 
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constructing discursive messages to cover it up and prevent another chaos for the regime and the 
society. The other example is the work of Jeszenszky (2006) who observed that there has been a 
persistent perception about the lives of Hungarian minorities, whose lives were the result of the 
Trianon Treaty after the end of the First World War. The perception had been perceived since 
1970s. However, after the revolution of 1956 the discussion about Hungarian minorities was 
seen as a taboo because the government tried to prevent any nationalist ideology among 
Hungarians. The perception of Hungarian minorities came to life again by Hungarian 
intellectuals, such as István Bibó in 1978 who mentioned the lives of Hungarian minorities in 
Hungary’s neighbours. The concern of Hungarian disapora has been spoken openly again after 
the transition to democracy, and FIDESZ government has captured the point of this issue by 
claiming the day of national unity through the Treaty of Trianon, which was announced by the 
Prime Minister himself, as well as the approval of citizenships to Hungarian diaspora in other 
states (Bozóki, 2011).  
This thesis believes that cultural trauma is a good reason to understand why the 
government of Hungary selects historical memories and represents them as political dialogue in 
Prime Minister’s speeches and texts in the constitution; it is because recent history of Hungary 
was comprised of tragedy and failure of revolutionaries, such as the 1848 and 1956 Revolution, 
especially the latter event in which Hungarians were suppressed heavily by the Soviet Union. In 
the next chapter, the thesis will try to prove this argument as well as answer the research 
questions of the thesis.  
 
Chapter 5: History as a political tool for legitimacy of FIDESZ and Prime Minister Orbán 
 
Everywhere has history and history lies everywhere. One question here: How will people 
remember history, especially the one that is far distant from the present? The answer might be 
the representation of history. Then, who will represent history? According to Lebel (2009), 
Pavlaković (2013), and Khazanov and Payne (2008), historical memory is represented by 
influential actors of a society with a purpose, and historical memories are intentionally 
constructed. Certainly, historical memories or historical events really occurred, but their details 
and meaning will be reinterpreted by the society under the representation of events or memories 
by the actors. Thus, chosen historical memories to the public will directly or indirectly manifest 
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the purposes of spoken actors. In this analysis part, the thesis will try to examine texts and 
messages in order to extract the purposes by using the theory of cultural trauma, the concept of 
political legitimacy and critical discourse analysis.   
 
1) Historical memories in the constitution 
 
The new constitution or the Fundamental Law of Hungary cited in this thesis is extracted from 
the official translation by the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice, which is published 
via the Hungarian government’s website on April 16, 20134. This section will try to analyse 
historical reference in the constitution with a discussion with researches studying on it. The 
thesis found that the law emphasises the foundation of Hungarian state, the commemoration of 
major historical events: 1848, 1956, and the foundation date of Hungarian state, and the legacy 
of communist regime and its crimes against Hungarian people. The section will present each part 
as follow:  
 
The foundation of the country 
 
Religion has become one important message in the Fundamental Law of 2011 of Hungary. 
Christianity and Saint Stephen are mentioned in the preamble of the new constitution as the 
foundation of the country,  
 
We are proud that our king Saint Stephen built the Hungarian State on solid ground and 
made our country a part of Christian Europe one thousand years ago… We recognise the 
role of Christianity in preserving nationhood. We value the various religious traditions of 
our country. 
 
This statement is not only reminding the beginning of the state of Hungary thousand years ago, 
but it also intentionally links Hungary to Europe, but there is the remark that it is “Christian 
Europe,” which is likely to be the old Europe as this “Christian Europe” reminds of religious 
                                                          
4
 The law can be downloaded at: http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-public-administration-and-justice 
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state, not secular states Europe is today. Besides, the holy crown of Saint Stephen is also 
mentioned,  
  
We honour the achievements of our historical constitution and we honour the Holy 
Crown, which embodies the constitutional continuity of Hungary’s statehood and the 
unity of the nation. 
 
Here the constitution refers to the ‘historical constitution’ and the Holy Crown. The latter is the 
Crown of Saint Stephen, the founding father of Hungarian nation in 1000 A.D., which is 
promoted as the source of the continuity of Hungarian nation and the unity of the nation. As the 
historical constitution, it is possible to refer to the Golden Bull of 1222, the law issued by King 
Andrew II of Hungary; it was about the rights of nobility in the state of Hungary and also limited 
the power of the king in the same way that Magna Charta of England in 1215. The Golden Bull 
thus was one of the first constitutional documents in European continent, which granted more 
rights to nobility, and became later the foundation of present constitutions. 
 Christianity, Saint Stephen, and the Holy Crown are the key words to remind of the 
foundation of Hungary, re-establishing the concept of where Hungarians were from. According 
to Halmai (2012), the constitution characterises the nation referred to as the subject of the 
constitution as a Christian community, narrowing even further the range of people able to 
recognise themselves as belonging to it. The intentional discursive message in this part of law is 
to stamp that, “Hungary is a Christian country and Hungarians are Christians,’ using historical 
foundation to stand the value of the whole society.  
Laura Ymayo Tartakoff (2012) refers to the opinion of Viktor Szigetvári, chief of staff to 
PM Gordon Bajnai in 2009 and campaigns director of the Hungarian Socialist Party during the 
parliamentary and municipal elections of 2006 and 2010, who said, “There is, politically 
speaking, in the new constitution too much taking care of our historical past. This is not in 
agreement with my values. However, it’s legitimate.” He did not disagree with this preamble as 
said that it was legitimate to him, but it was also historical. Thus, according to this constitution, 
Hungary under FIDESZ government is trying to promote Christian value and preserving 
Christian tradition of the country, and this attempt is likely to be legitimate via its historical 
foundation.  
34 
 
 
 
The beginning of present Hungary 
 
After the foundation of the country, the preamble states another born of present day Hungary by 
mentioning the 1956 event as the beginning of today Hungary,  
 
We agree with the Members of the first free Parliament, which proclaimed as its first 
decision that our current liberty was born of our 1956 Revolution. 
 
Despite the tragedy of the revolution, the constitution represents it in a positive outlook as the 
beginning of the liberty of Hungary. This is a new interpretation and representation of the event 
by drafters of the constitution because it is obvious that the 1956 Revolution ended with failure 
of revolutionaries and it is clearly a national trauma for Hungarians. The liberty of 1956 is 
different from the foundation by Saint Stephen, which gave birth to the nation, as the 1956, 
according to the law, is the year of freedom of Hungarians under communist rulers. In order to 
emphasise the liberation of the country, in the preamble it denies the legitimacy of the 
communist rulers, 
 
We deny any statute of limitations for the inhuman crimes committed against the 
Hungarian nation and its citizens under the national socialist and the communist 
dictatorship. We do not recognise the communist constitution of 1949, since it was the 
basis for tyrannical rule; therefore we proclaim it to be invalid. 
 
And in article U of this constitution states the detail of this revolution by mentioning the crime of 
communist dictatorship for suppressing the 1956 Revolution,  
 
The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and its legal predecessors and the other political 
organisations established to serve them in the spirit of communist ideology were criminal 
organisations, and their leaders have responsibility without statute of limitations for:… 
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h) suppressing with bloodshed, in cooperation with Soviet occupying forces, the 
Revolution and War of Independence, which broke out on 23 October 1956, the ensuing 
reign of terror and retaliation, and the forced flight of two hundred thousand Hungarian 
people from their native country; 
 
This article mentions the communist regime as the criminal organisations and one of their crimes 
was the suppression of 1956 Revolution, or of the liberty of Hungarians according to the 
constitution. It is understandable for the definition of “criminal organisations,” aiming to 
emphasise that the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSzMP) was the enemy of Hungarians 
and Hungarian liberty. Moreover, MSzMP after 1990 was divided into two successors; one of 
them is the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), which became the government of Hungary 
between 2006 and 2010. As the successor of the criminal organisations, MSZP is likely to be 
pressed down by the constitution, though it didn’t directly mention MSZP. According to 
Pribersky (2008), FIDESZ had criticised MSZP before during the protests of 2006 as the legacy 
of the communist regime; thus, this constitution as the tool of FIDESZ is repeating the same 
discourse from 2006. It is likely that under this constitution, the chance for MSZP to return to the 
parliament as the majority or the ruling party is less due to the dominate discourse as the 
successor of the criminals of Hungary.   
 
Commemoration of the past 
 
In article J, it states the national holidays, which are all related to historical events of the past, 
 
 (1) The national holidays of Hungary are: 
a) the 15th day of March, in memory of the 1848–49 Revolution and War of 
Independence, 
b) the 20th day of August, in memory of the foundation of the State and King Saint 
Stephen the State Founder, and 
c) the 23rd day of October, in memory of the 1956 Revolution and War of Independence. 
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Both 1848 and 1956 are mentioned in the same category as the revolution and war of 
independence, but there is a remark that 1848 is not as crucial as 1956 because in this 
constitution it is mentioned only one time. It appears that the constitution intends to refer to the 
communist era and the revolution of 1956. Thus, the law emphasises the memory of communist 
era as the time of terror and crimes against Hungarians and as the beginning of liberty of the 
present Hungary, whereas the revolution of 1848, though it is still important to be the national 
day and the commemoration, seems to be far more distant memory and less important for the 
present politics, especially for FIDESZ in preserving its ruling status and forming the image of 
MSZP as the successor of criminal communist rulers.  
 
2) Historical reference in Orbán’s speeches 
 
The analysis of this section intends to 1) seek historical reference in the premier’s speeches, 2) 
the context he is speaking and the relation between the context and his reference to history, and 
3) examine the conformity of his reference to the reference of history in the Fundamental Law. 9 
speeches have been examined and analysed; they were addressed in front of the public during the 
national holidays or national addresses and religious commemoration. As it has stated earlier, 
CDA will be the approach for this analysis. 
The analysis will begin with his speech on the celebration of National Day on July 1, 
2010. The core message he mentioned to the past is “freedom” and “independence” which came 
by “fight”. These three words are related, referring to the struggle of the past. He didn’t mention 
the years of struggles but he tried to repeat the “faith” or “spirit” of fight in Hungarians, despite 
the fact that there is no more war and Hungarians are now an independent state. Then, the reason 
he usually referred to “freedom” and “independence” is the present fight, which is likely to be 
international politics more than domestic politics because the domestic issues seem to be under 
control by his party.  
 
“The Hungarian nation has also been created based on this credo, on strong faith, and this 
faith made us capable of offering protection in times when Europe required it. This strong 
faith helped our nation to get always back on its feet after devastating tragedies, crises, 
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and wars, and never, not even in the most depressing moments of our history let us give 
up our freedom and our independence.” (Orbán, 2010) 
 
In this speech, he emphasised that the Hungarian nation had been through ‘tragedies,’ ‘cries,’ 
and ‘wars’ by strong faith. Because of this faith, the nation of Hungary survived and never gave 
up being free and independent. He also compared the fight for freedom of Hungarians to the 
Americans’. 
 
“…since we had to fight so many times, even against large powers for our freedom and 
our independence. Just as the Americans we also have never given up, not even in 
periods it seemed hopeless for decades or even for centuries, regardless of how many 
attempts there has been to deprive the American and the Hungarian people of their 
freedom and of their faith in freedom.” (Orbán, Ibid) 
 
Then, in 2011, he made the State of Nation Address on February 7 talking about the reborn of 
Hungarian nation:  
 
“Renewal means that we will put Hungarian life back on its feet. We could also say that 
renewal is about being born again. A nation being born again… Born again is when a 
nation gathers its resources, national traditions, the valiant and successful moments of its 
history, the lessons learned from its failures and sufferings into one great gesture to shake 
itself, to stop drifting and to change the world around it.” (Orbán, 2011) 
 
He did not directly mention the past events, but referred to the past failure and the need to revive 
the country from the failure. He mentioned to the great events like the French Revolution, the 
English Industrial Revolution, and the American Independence. Despite the successful stories of 
the three major historical events, he would like to emphasize that Hungary was able to rebound 
from the failure to be a greater nation like the three events by mentioning to “spirit” again.  
 
“Yes, we know the wonderful manifestations of the Hungarian spirit, the thousand-year 
Christian state organization, the valiant protection of Europe, Rákóczi’s liberation 
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movement, the nation building by Széchenyi, the ’48 and ’56 revolutions, our world 
famous scientists, artists and athletes. The Hungarian spirit is what gave numerous new 
things to the world. After every historic tribulation, it was the strength of the Hungarian 
spirit that was able to put the country back on its feet.” (Orbán, Ibid) 
 
He referred to this spirit and said there was no legal document writing about the spirit. Thus it is 
necessary to write it into the constitution of the country. The then Hungarian Constitution was 
written from 1989 and he said “it is not the work of the Hungarian spirit”, and that the present 
spirit of Hungarians came from the 1956 Revolution, which was not mentioned by the then 
constitution. Therefore, Hungary, according to PM, needed a new constitution with Hungarian 
spirit inside “that provides closure for the past and creates a final foundation, thereby secures the 
future of Hungary. This is how renewal will lead to being born again.” (Orbán, Ibid) 
Thus, his address aimed to legitimate his government’s decision in drafting the new 
constitution by mentioning the Hungarian spirit, which was originated from the past, especially 
the 1956 Revolution. 
 
“Hungarian life today is built on the foundations of the ’56 revolution. Our constitution 
does not mention a single word about it. Hungary needs a new constitution that manifests 
the Hungarian spirit,” (Orbán, Ibid) 
 
In total, he combineed the idea of Hungarian spirit to the revolution of 1848 and 1956 as the 
liberation movement to rebuild the nation. Despite the failure of both revolutions, the spirit of 
fight of Hungarians didn’t end; it begins again and this time the nation has been reborn in the 
present day, but to be born again it needs to remind of the spirit. Here he clearly stated that the 
foundation of today Hungary is the 1956 revolution, and to remind this foundation it is necessary 
to talk about this year. That’s the reason why the new constitution is needed; to manifest the 
Hungarian spirit. Thus, the new constitution, or the Fundamental Law, is also the representative 
of the 1956 Revolution and Hungarian spirit, and he and his party, FIDESZ, as the adopters, can 
be seen as the representatives of Hungarians, not only of the present, but of the 1956 
revolutionaries at the same time.  
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He still repeated the discourse of 1956 Revolution. On October 23, 2012, on the occasion 
of the anniversary of the 1956 Revolution, he again praised the event as “the fight for 
independence made the world a better place” with an attempt to link the communist regime with 
socialist government by saying that the communist regime repressed Hungarian democracy and 
those who fought on October 23 were the model of fighters for independence. The discourse of 
fighters for independence was mentioned too in the protests of 2006 against the socialist 
government, the event which his party was the leading opposition party in the parliament and led 
the protests.  
 
“Every year, October 23 reminds us that the ambitions of those who put down the 
revolution and fight for independence have not disappeared from Hungarian public life. It 
is enough to recall the events of 23 October 2006: mounted police charges, teargas, iron 
bars and plastic bullets, followed by the decoration and rewarding of those who were at 
the forefront of the brutality. We would do well to keep this in mind.” (Orbán, 2012) 
 
Meanwhile, he mentioned to the whole Europe under the direction of the European Union. He 
referred to Christianity and said without this religion, Europe had no soul. And he also implied 
that Europe was likely to rule and control Hungary again like what happened after the end of the 
Second World War with the Paris Treaties.  
 
“Let us consider the fact that if in 1956, ten years after the Second World War, the 
signing of the Paris Peace Treaties and the Russian occupation, the Hungarian nation was 
capable of taking up arms to fight for its freedom then we, the Hungarians of today, 
should have no reason to doubt our own strength.” (Orbán, Ibid) 
 
Then, he mentioned the 1956 Revolution as the revolution for freedom; he mentioned the 
Trianon Treaty, in which Hungary was separated by the agreement of European powers to point 
out that today now Hungary can stand on its feet and Europe has no right to take control Hungary 
and Hungarians again, and the crisis of Eurozone can’t harm Hungary if all citizens here believe 
in their hearts and faith in the country. 
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“Yes, ninety years after the Treaty of Trianon we were able to give hundreds of 
thousands of Hungarians back their nationality through cross-border consolidation of the 
nation.” (Orbán, Ibid) 
 
Thus, in this speech he tried to conceptualise that Hungary had been under control of external 
forces, whether Western Europe or the Soviet Union. It is the time not to repeat that experiences 
again. It is the reason for him to mention the Trianon Treaty, which resulted to the separation of 
Historical Hungary after the First World War. In this context, he wanted to protect Hungarian 
sovereignty and economy from the outside force, so he mentioned the trauma of the past to 
remind Hungarians not to go back, but believe in today power of the country and themselves. 
However, he as the Prime Minister seemed to convince people to believe in him and follow his 
and his party’s path as well. 
 During the national address in 2013, he mentioned the mistake of the communist regime 
of making the country’s economy down by borrowing foreign funds. He promised that Hungary 
will not repeat the same mistake again. Moreover, he linked the crisis of economy of Hungary to 
Europe and said the turning point was in 2010, when his party was elected as ruling party in the 
parliament. This is an attempt to present the leading role and the righteousness of his FIDESZ in 
leading the country with legitimacy because his party and his term is the new route of Hungary 
and the country will unite to move forward again after the failure for almost 20 years after the 
transition to democracy. At the same time, he also criticised the socialist government, which he 
usually mentioned as the children of communist regime; this is likely to be his intention to 
prevent the return to power of the Socialist Party and maintain his power as the government. 
 
“What our great-grandparents built was swept away by World War II and the peace 
system. What our grandparents and parents built was swept away by the incompetent 
economic policies of the Communist system, which lured us into a debt trap and confined 
the entire country to a caged existence. The failure of Socialism took its toll on the 
economy even if Hungary was a reservation in the Eastern part of Europe which seemed 
to be an unsteady mixture of a forced labour camp and a trade union holiday resort. And 
finally, what we constructed after the change of political system until 2002 collapsed 
between 2002 and 2010. If we think of our nerve-endings, corroded by historical life 
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experiences and much like the worn-out brakes of a bicycle, over fifty percent 
satisfaction in a quality-of-life survey is not so bad after all.” (Orbán, 2013b) 
 
“…We will never again commit the mistake of the Kádár administration and the 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party; we will never finance welfare expenditure by taking 
on loans, foreign loans. … The underlying reason for the collapse of the Hungarian 
economy in 2008 was that after 2002, the Socialists broke this historical agreement.” 
(Orbán, Ibid) 
 
He mentioned the foreign invasions and external factors to the change of the country. In this 
sense, he implies to the EU in coming to control the economic policies of the country and he 
seems to convey a message that he will not allow the EU to rule over the country’s policies, 
especially in economic policies. He wants to guarantee this in front of Hungarians to confirm the 
strength of the country and the unity of Hungarians. Why he did so? It seems he wants to stand in 
front of the citizens to prove the strength of his government and raise nationalism, which is the 
main ideology supporting this government.  
 The confirmation of the legitimacy of the new Fundamental Law was mentioned again 
during the speech on Memorial Day of the Victims of Communism.  
 
“Our task today is to build a country in which no one can be discriminated against 
because of their gender, origin, religion, political views and national or linguistic 
affiliations. This is why we have created a new Fundamental Law that assures more 
rights than ever before and declares the inviolability of human dignity, the rights to 
freedom and personal safety and the protection of property.” (Orbán, 2013a) 
 
He mentioned the brutality and the suppression of freedom during communist era, and the acts 
by the communist regime was to destroy human dignity and freedom of Hungarians. Thus, in this 
new era, the country needs to establish and reassure those two things. It is the reason why the 
country needs new supreme law to guarantee better lives of Hungarians (Orbán, 2013a). 
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 Christian value and Saint Stephen have been promoted as written in the constitution. 
Moreover, the speech to mark the Saint Stephen Memorial Year also raised the unity of the 
Hungarian nation through Christianity,  
 
“When Stephen was chosen as monarch, the federation of Hungarian tribes was in a state 
of disintegration and the Hungarian tribes were at war with each other while pieces of the 
territory we had already occupied were being slowly bitten away by the neighbouring 
Czech, Polish and German princes and kings. We imagine a divided association of tribes 
which is being weakened from within and under constant attack from neighbouring 
states, and which is continuously losing its power, its territories and its internal strength. 
Saint Stephen, looking forward well beyond the problems of everyday life, his political 
struggles and petty bickering, began by taking the lead and thus saving his homeland and 
its people from disintegration.” (Orbán, 2013c) 
 
Thus, Saint Stephen prevented the Hungarian nation from the disintegration, and he is also the 
representative of Christian value in the society. In other word, Christianity is the guard of 
Hungarian nation and the key of unity of the Hungarian nation. He again emphasises the 
importance of Christianity on March 4, 2014,  
 
“In our view, Christian culture is the guiding force of Hungarian history. We aren't 
European on account of geographical reasons; we are European because we are 
Christians, and we are guided by the firm belief that we can only build a strong and 
successful Hungary on these traditions, on these national, Christian and European 
traditions.” (Orbán, 2014a) 
 
At this point, he seemed to criticise Europe for lacking the value of Christianity and this can be 
interested that he did now welcome to join with Europe that lacks of Christian value, 
 
“Yet Europe today needs a simultaneous combination of courageous resolve, common 
sense and the uplifting of hearts. Europe should recognise that without nations it has no 
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heart, and without Christianity it has no soul. A special thank you to the Peace March, 
which made a stand for this vision of a European Hungary.” (Orbán, 2012) 
 
He directly mentioned MSZP, or the Socialist Party, as the communists in his state of the Nation 
Address in 2014,  
 
“The communists came back to power, or rather the socialists, along with their sidecar 
liberals. They came back to power and by 2010 they had brought the country to ruin. 
Financial collapse, an economic nosedive, dwindling pensions and salaries, an IMF 
lifeline and a whole country on life support” 
 
He mentions the mistake of the Socialist regime and its failure; this time he goes through 
economic issue. Besides, the liberal parties which become allies with the Socialist Party are 
mentioned in the same category of the Socialist as the opponent or the enemy of his party and 
Hungarians. He also goes further that, 
 
“We can safely say that if anything, this is certainly a true revolution and a true regime 
change. Hungary has become rejuvenated both in soul and in spirit. This is no longer the 
country it was four years ago… We have won many battles, but we have yet to win the 
war. What has happened is simply that instead of retreating, we have begun to fight 
back.” (Orbán, 2014b) 
 
What ‘war’ he means here is the war against multinational corporations and foreign banks, which 
he criticises as the enemy of Hungary. In general, this speech is about economic issues, which 
needs a protection from foreign corporations, but in order to link his economic policies he 
mentions the mistake of the Socialist Party (MSZP) for bringing the country into an economic 
ruin with foreign debts. This also links to international relations with the European Union about 
the sovereignty of Hungary and economic issue.  
On March 15, 2014, now he spoke a lot about the 1848 Revolution; he put details of the 
liberators and the movement by a girl from Pest in 1972 which led to the resistance against the 
communist regime again since 1956. 
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“On 15 March 1848, once the Youths of March had … finished printing the National 
Song and the Twelve Points … they went home to have lunch. In the afternoon, in the 
pouring rain, the upstanding citizens of Pest gathered once again here, on these very 
steps. And this is the 165th time we have celebrated their courage … The historians are 
also searching for the answer to who planted the bulbs of freedom in the humus of the 
Hungarian people and when. They recorded the fact that in 1972, in the middle of the 
communist oppression, a girl from Pest braided a ribbon bearing the colours of the 
national flag into her hair and walked out to 15 March Square with a violet in her hand. 
Nobody knows who that girl was. They sang the National Anthem and the Kossuth Song, 
and that was the beginning of the resistance against the Soviet tyranny… It is interesting 
that our heroes are often not the victors, and in fact at first glance may seem to be the 
losers. They were defeated, beaten back, exiled and executed. But regardless, in some 
form it is nevertheless they who rewrote the book of fate. What was written in the book 
of fate in 1848 was that there is nothing we can do against the Habsburg Empire. And if 
the people of the time had accepted this, then that fate would have come to pass and the 
Hungarians would have been engulfed by the German ocean.” (Orbán, 2014c)  
 
This time he accepts that the revolutionaries of 1848 were the losers, but the point is that those 
revolutionaries didn’t accept their fate. They fought on, and because of the fight Hungarians have 
today. Then, he also mentioned the unity of the nation. According to Bozóki (2011), Orbán once 
in 2012 said that the day the Treaty of Trianon was in effect was also the day of national unity. 
This time he didn’t mention the treaty but telling his audience that to strengthen the country the 
country needs unity: “And today, the name of unity is 6 April (Orbán, 2014c),” which was 
actually the day of general election of 2014. 
He reminds of the past not for depriving his nation, but to repeat the Hungarians not to go 
back to the communists, or in this context, the Socialist. And at the same time, he recalls the past 
of 1956 and 1848 for the spirit of freedom fighter.  
To conclude, his public discourse surrounds the word of spirit, freedom, fighters, unity, 
Christianity, communists, and revolutions of 1956. The communist legacy and the 1956 
revolution were mentioned to attack the communists and its successor, MSZP, whereas he used 
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other words to confirm the stability and the future of present Hungary as well as the need for the 
new Fundamental Law, which has become the strong foundation for the power of his 
government. Also, he tried to convince Hungarians not to be under the rule of foreign powers 
again, which in this context is the EU and foreign companies. The political messages of Viktor 
Orbán are likely to arouse confidence of Hungarians in their nation and in his government. He 
tried to turn the emotion of tragic moments of the country, especially the 1956 Revolution, into 
the sign of country’s uprising in the present against national burdens from the inside and outside. 
Meanwhile, the texts in the constitution try to set a new foundation of the country by referring 
the past and, in the same time, to remind Hungarians about the struggles of the past. However, 
the texts can’t present emotion or the sense of national trauma like people, whereas the speeches 
of Orbán, despite many references to the failures of Hungarian struggles, are not a remembrance 
of pain or trauma; instead, they are more nationalism awakening. Besides, as a political actor he 
is the producer of this historical discourse, which means he uses historical memories for the 
interest of his own and his party.    
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion  
 
This thesis has tried to observe that how historical memories have been used by the current 
government of Hungary by arguing that the memories are a tool for political interest, especially 
legitimacy of the government, with cultural trauma as the theory for analysing the texts in the 
constitution of Hungary and speeches of Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán. 
 The thesis found that that 1956 Revolution and communist terror are the major reference 
of the past four years of FIDESZ and the Prime Minister. The 1956 is not mentioned as a tragedy 
or trauma. On the other hand, it is mentioned as the beginning of the present Hungary; the liberty 
of the nation and the spirit of Hungarians as a new representation of history of Hungary. This 
spirit is referred to as the key for drafting the new Fundamental Law as Orbán tried to convince 
his audience that the previous constitution of 1989 didn’t mention anything about the spirit. He 
used this revolution to back up the legitimacy of his government in drafting the new constitution, 
which has given a similar-dictatorial power to his government. Meanwhile, he attacked 
opposition party like the Socialist Party (MSZP) several times by calling the party as the 
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communists. It is clear that he tried to link the communist regime to MSZP; this is an attempt to 
prevent the return of MSZP in election and politics of the country.  
 Apart from the 1956, he mentioned Christian value and criticised Europe without this 
value as non-true Europe. Meanwhile, he talked about the Treaty of Trianon and the 1848 
Revolution as the experience of external forces controlling Hungary. In other words, he is trying 
to expel the influence of the European Union and it seems that he rather disagree with the 
European integration by saying that Europe doesn’t have the value of Christianity. Meanwhile, 
he proclaimed the unity of the nation through historical experiences, especially prior the election 
of 2014.  
 Thus, history has become a tool for Viktor Orbán and his government in making himself 
and his party legitimate in drafting the supreme law, whereas attacking his opponent. Also, he 
uses history to guard the national property and sovereignty from the EU’s influence. With the 
constitution as his back up, it is likely that FIDESZ government will be able to rule the country 
longer, bringing more worries to Europe and pro-liberals democracy in Hungary. 
 However, it is unfortunate for the thesis to find any crossing with the theory of cultural 
trauma. This is because the Prime Minister and the constitution are producers of the messages, 
which according to Pavlaković (2013) and Khazanov and Payne (2008) they should be selected 
carefully by the premier and the drafters of the Fundamental Law. It can state that the 
government select those memories to refer to in the constitution and in the speeches because they 
were once tragedies of the nation; certainly, 1848 and 1956 Revolutions were the failures of 
Hungarian revolutionaries, but others like Saint Stephen or Christianity were not. Besides, the 
representation of historical memories from the sources this thesis examine is for arousing 
nationalism atmosphere and stance to fight against national burdens, not for remembering the 
past with sorrow or tragic emotion. In order to measure the impact of cultural trauma, it might be 
better useful of the theory of cultural trauma with Hungarian responses to the speech of Prime 
Minister and the details of the constitution. Due to the limitation of time in writing this thesis, the 
author could not run for the responses. In addition, the language burden is the most major 
problem the author has encountered in finding sources.  
Thus, the thesis can only conclude that it is certain for the utilisation of historical memory 
in political discourse of Hungarian constitution and Prime Minister, which aims to make both the 
constitution and the government legitimate, whether by attacking the socialist opposition party or 
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giving chauvinist political messages to the public like unity, liberty, or freedom. However, it is 
unable to prove clearly that cultural trauma has a massive impact to the selection of historical 
memories as it lacks of reaction from Hungarians.   
 
Suggestion for further research  
 
The major research that should be done further from this project is the survey on the perception 
of Hungarians toward historical discourse presented by FIDESZ government and the 
constitution. It is really crucial to prove whether cultural trauma affects to Hungarians or not, 
which will help this thesis to be better complete. Next is comparative studies between the current 
Fundamental Law and the previous constitution of 1989, which is a reform version of 1949, 
would be interesting case in order to see the texts inside both supreme laws and comparing what 
messages they intend to state, especially the context of historical references. It is certain that the 
new Fundamental Law of 2011 states about historical memories of 1848 and 1956, but what is 
about the constitution of 1989. Another suggestion is other policies relevant to history by 
FIDESZ government, especially those relevant to the Treaty of Trianon. This thesis has found a 
little mentions of the treaty, but as Nora Berend (2014) wrote in History Today that the current 
Hungarian government has established its own historical research institute, Veritas, which is 
keen to erect a state commemoration of the German Invasion of Hungary on 19th March 1944. 
The FIDESZ party is trying to manipulate history by connecting to the interwar authoritarian 
regime of Admiral Miklós Horthy. So, what is the reason behind this move or what the 
government will gain from this move which is actually causing objections from Jewish 
community as Horthy was accused of Jewish deportation during the Second World War.   
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